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C. M. Arymowicz* Greenwood Shopping Plaza
Ltd. v. Beattie and Pettipas:
Life Masquerading as a
Contract Case
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the defendants in
Greenwood Shopping Plaza Ltd. v. Beattie and Pettipas1 could not
claim any benefit from a contract because they were third party
beneficiaries thereto. Restated, the Court permitted the insurer of a
building to reach through the landlord and the tenant, and recoup
itself by saddling the tenant's employees with liability for
negligently performing their jobs although it could sue neither
landlord nor tenant. This result is so unpalatable to both business
and labour that it will be avoided, and insurers will acquiesce. In
this note I will, (a) by way of introduction, comment generally on
the Court's judgment and set out a framework for the subsequent
discussion, (b) undertake a textual analysis of the judgment
rendered at each level of litigation, (c) comment on Greenwood as a
third party beneficiary case, and (d) show that the case might have
been differently determined had it been viewed as a landlord-tenant,
insurance or employee's liability case.
I. Introduction
Beattie and Pettipas negligently set fire to their employer's rented
garage while welding tire storage racks. The lease between their
employer, Neil J. Buchanan Ltd., and the landlord, Greenwood
Shopping Plaza Ltd., contained several provisions relating to fire
insurance. The landlord promised to insure the replacement cost of
the building or to notify the tenant of its inability to obtain such
insurance. Both landlord and tenant promised to have their
respective insurers waive their subrogation rights, although they
failed to identify the persons to be benefitted by the waiver or the
* C. M. Arymowicz, Associate Professor of Law, Dalhousie University, Halifax,
N.S.
1. [1980) 2 S.C.R. 228; 111 D.L.R. (3d) 257; 10 B.L.R. 234; revg. (sub nom.
Greenwood Shopping Plaza Ltd. v. Neil J. Buchanan Ltd. No. 2) (1979), 99
D.L.R. (3d) 289; 31 N.S.R. (2d) 168 (N.S.S.C.A.D.); affg. (1978), 31 N.S.R.
(2d) 1 and 34 N.S.R. (2d) 217 (N.S.S.C.T.D.) (supplementary reasons delivered
July 27, 1978).
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conduct to which the waiver would extend. Instead of insuring as
the lease required, the landlord insured only the original cost plus a
fixed percentage. The cost of reconstruction exceeded the coverage.
The insurer subrogated itself to Greenwood against the tenant and
its employees, and Greenwood sued both these defendants for its
excess loss and for other heads of damage.
Both Trial and Appeal Divisions of the Nova Scotia Supreme
Court held that the insurance provisions were to be treated as if they
had been effected. Accordingly, they relieved the tenant of
responsibility for the excess loss. Recent case law2 made this
conclusion predictable; the novelty in the case was the claim against
the employees. 3 The Nova Scotia courts excused the employees to
the same extent as their employer. Only the employees' liability was
contested before the Supreme Court of Canada. The Court reversed
and permitted the insurer to subrogate itself to the landlord-insured
against the tenant's employees.
The Court reached this decision through an analysis bereft of
"singing reason". 4 The Court perceived Greenwood as a simple
contract case and perfunctorily classified the employees as third
party beneficiaries of a contract. Following English authority from
another legal generation unquestioningly, the Court applied the
third party rule as if doctrine has a legitimate life independent of the
prior transactions which gave rise to it and the subsequent
transactions which it is to regulate.
Courts have accomplished much worthwhile by selectively
applying black letter doctrine mechanically, but I can see only
2. The governing cases culminate with T. Eaton Co. v. Smith, [1978] 2 S.C.R.
749; (1977), 92 D.L.R. (3d) 425. Their ratio is uncertain: see infra, note 23. In
T. Eaton the landlord promised to insure, and the tenant promised to repair with
certain exceptions, not including waste caused by his own negligence. Ross
Southward Tire Ltd. v. Pyrotech Products Ltd., [1976] 2 S.C.R. 35, (1975), 57
D.L.R. (3d) 248, had the additional fact that the tenant was obliged to pay
insurance premiums. The rent under the Greenwood lease was a fixed amount,
rather than net-net. Nevertheless, Greenwood is a stronger case for the tenant
because of the 'waiver of subrogation rights' clause.
3. The Supreme Court in T. Eaton v. Smith authorized a rehearing on the issue of
the employee's liability. The issue was abandoned before trial, noted in Greenwood
Shopping Plaza Ltd. v. Neil J. Buchanan Ltd. No. 2 (1979), 99 D.L.R. (3d) 289 at
292 (N.S.S.C.A.D.).
4. The expression is taken from K. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition:
Deciding Appeals at 183. A rule with a singing reason is one ". . .which wears
both a right situation sense and a clear scope criterion on its face. . ." I have
adopted some of Llewellyn's terminology and, I hope, not misused his ideas in this
note.
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objections to the judgment in Greenwood. The Court, by fixing
liability on the employees, reversed, indeed perverted, centuries of
progress in the common law towards making enterprises absorb the
incidental costs of their existence and distributing losses over a
broad base. Thus, the result ignores that negligence is an artificial
concept which pretends to focus on the personal fault of the
individual tortfeasor in order to serve the afore-mentioned and other
ends. The joint and several liability rules work in conjunction with
negligence doctrine, but under Greenwood the "deep pocket" can
be an employee at "fault" only to the extent of 1% yet liable for the
"personal faults" of co-workers. The result is even more unfair and
further confounds public policy if the employer unwillingly hired or
retained these co-workers because he was obliged to respect public
values relating to equal opportunity or the rights of labour and
subordinated optimal economic efficiency in his own business.
The parties themselves had sought to allocate the risk of loss and
insure against its occurrence, but the result disrupts an attempt at
private ordering, which not only would have facilitated the law's
purposes, but is in itself desirable.
Even reducing the level of analysis from broad issues of public
policy to the level of the parties does not reveal a worthwhile
purpose. The suit ostensibly benefits an insurer after all, not a
coffeehouse bookmaker, and the principal risk insured came to
fruition in the most likely way. The insurer's subrogation action
prejudices the person who paid the premium. 5 Given the reality of
collecting on judgments against employees, the subrogation right is
largely theoretical; even if it were substantial, subrogation comes at
an exorbitant cost. The few dollars make little difference to the
insurer or to premiums, but their loss devastates the employees' way
of life, hopes and morale.
5. Pursuing the employees prejudices the employer to a varying extent by
disturbing labour relations. The rule barring subrogation against the insured is
narrower however. The insurer cannot subrogate against the insured himself, rather
than to his prejudice. However, a court should not be astute to prejudice the
insured. I argue in Part IV, infra, that the tenant effectively paid the premiums
through his rent and therefore he is or ought to be an "insured". However, the
primary objection to the decision is not that the Court failed to consider the tenant
an insured within the policy. Following the Court's reasons, the result would not
have differed if (a) the tenant had paid for the insurance through a net-net clause or
even if (b) the tenant was a named insured and paid the premiums directly to the
insurer. The Supreme Court implicitly accepted Lister v. Romford Ice and Cold
Storage Co., [1957] A.C. 555 (H.L.), see Part III, infra.
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The decision is unjust and impractical, but the method by which
the decision was reached is even more problematic than the result.
Businessmen can easily avoid the result, albeit at some expense.
But a judicial style based on deference to a foreign court and
conceptualization divorced from any factual context has profound
and unavoidable consequences should it become characteristic of a
court of last resort. These matters are, however, past the scope of
this note, for it will discuss primarily the doctrinal aspects of
Greenwood.
In the face of the Court's approach one cannot disagree with Karl
Llewellyn's conception of the relationship between legal rules and
commercial life. Rules should manifest the continuously evolving
relational equities rather than prescribe "rigid moulds ' ' 6 for
commercial interaction. The Greenwood controversy arises from a
transaction comprised of a number of legally recognized relation-
ships. By shining different lights on the facts of Greenwood, we see
a landlord-tenant, corporation, master-servant, and insurance case;
if pressed, even a particular kind of contract case. That the law
regulating some one of these subjects had not already prevented the
result in Greenwood is not indicative that the law is deficient either
as an institution or as a body of doctrine. The Greenwood facts are
novel; the law's evolution can never be complete. Furthermore, the
law had a substantial doctrinal basis for the requisite extensions,
some of which are relatively small, all of which are welcome. The
facts in Greenwood could have been the catalyst.
Thus, I will argue that as a matter of landlord-tenant law, the risk
of loss of the premises should be borne by the party to the lease who
has insurance against the risk. As a matter of master-servant law,
vicarious immunity should be a rule of law rather than be effected
indirectly and unreliably through legal contrivances. As a matter of
corporate law, if the organic theory of corporate responsibility can
vitalize a corporation with an employee, 7 an employee should be
able to shelter himself under the corporation. As a matter of
insurance law, the insurer should not be able to differentiate
between the business entity and its employee when it has insured the
6. The words are the Court's, (1980), 111 D.L.R. (3d) 257 at 263.
7. Lennard's Carrying Co. Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co., Ltd., [1915] A.C. 705
(H.L.).
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business entity against liability for mere negligence. 8 As a matter of
contract law, the third party rule should be reformulated at least to
the extent of sequestering "joint beneficiary" cases:
Looking at Greenwood variously is all very well, but at the end of
the day one must come to a decision. I see Greenwood as,
essentially, a landlord-tenant case. I will argue that in such a
relationship the party who has insured against the risk should bear
the loss. He, or rather his insurer as subrogee, should have some
right to shift the loss, for example to a careless passerby or an
arsonist, but not to someone so closely identified with a party as, for
example, a careless employee acting within the course of
employment.
II. Greenwood in the Courts
The separate liability of the employees was not argued at trial until
counsel applied for the order (on judgment).9 Cowan, C.J.T.D.,
stated in his supplementary reasons for judgment:
Counsel were not able to cite any authority in support of their
respective views and the point appears to be of first impression. 10
Cowan denied the insurer's claim against the employees because,
• . .it follows logically that if there is no right of subrogation
against the Buchanan company, in respect of the particular loss,
there should be no right of subrogation against the employees of
the Buchanan company for whose negligence the Buchanan
company is responsible. 11
The employees' position was argued on appeal inter alia. The
Nova Scotia Supreme Court, Appeal Division, appears to have seen
Greenwood primarily as an insurance case, 12 although its reasons
are not couched in terms of insurance law. The Court of Appeal
affirmed in a judgment which showed sensitivity, ingenuity and a
talent for purposive obfuscation. I will summarize and comment on
the court's reasons because it is difficult to state its ratio. The
8. This position is already good law on special facts. Morris v. Ford Motor Co.,
[1973] 1 Q.B. 792 (C.A.).
9. Most of the controversy at trial was about the fire's cause and the tenant's initial
liability. Resolution of these questions takes up 37 of the 44 pages of the trial
judgment.
10. (1978), 34 N.S.R. (2d) 217 at 219 (N.S.S.C.T.D.).
11. Id., Contra, Lister v. Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co., [1957] A.C. 555
(H.L.) infra,but see, Morris v. Ford Motor Co., [1973] 1 Q.B. 792 (C.A.)
distinguishing Lister.
12. (1979), 99 D.L.R. (3d) 289 at 294 (N.S.S.C.A.D.).
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reasons either are twofold, or there is only one chain of reasoning
with two steps.
First. The employees were protected by the lease because,
• . .Buchanan, in obtaining indirect insurance coverage against
liability for its own negligence, must have intended to cover also
its employees' liability since its negligence as a corporation only
arises vicariously from its employees' negligent acts or
omissions . . . Greenwood can, it seems to me, no more sue
Buchanan's employees than it can sue Buchanan. 
13
The court speculated that T. Eaton Co. Ltd. v. Smith14 might be
authority for this statement. (T. Eaton is an important case to which
repeated reference will be made.)
Second. The court rejected appellant's contention that the
employees could not benefit from the covenant to insure because
they were third party beneficiaries of a contract. The employees
succeeded because - for the sake of brevity and using the court's
word - they were "identified" with the immune employer.
The court began this branch of its judgment by rejecting, as
mistaken dicta, passages from Scruttons Ltd. v. Midland Silicones
Ltd. 15 which state that the plaintiff's exemption of the master does
not ipso facto bar a suit against an employee. The court then held
that in this case the third party rule did not prevent the employees
from obtaining the same rights as their master,
... because the employees of the tenant . . . are not strangers to
the contract. They are impliedly beneficiaries of the covenant to
insure and thus fall within one of Lord Reid's
exceptions . . . namely where the parties to the contract have
intended the exemption from liability to extend to the alleged
stranger or third party.16
The last sentence suggests that the parties' intent is pivotal to the
issue. This idea is the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal's, despite the
reference to Lord Reid. The Court of Appeal paraphrased Lord Reid
out of context.
The court inferred from the landlord's promise to place insurance
the further promises, (a) not to sue the tenant, and (b) to assume the
risk itself. T. Eaton is authority for at least the first inferred
13. Id. at 293-4.
14. [1978] 2 S.C.R. 749; 92 D.L.R. (3d) 425.
15. [1962] A.C. 446 at 478 (H.L.), Lord Reid was addressing himself to what is
called vicarious immunity in shorthand. Vicarious immunity will be discussed
throughout the text.
16. (1979), 99 D.L.R. (3d) 289 at 294 (N.S.S.C.A.D.).
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promise. But the court broke new ground in protecting the
employees, because they were not signatories of the lease nor were
employees defendants in T. Eaton. 17 The court wrote:
• . .this promise (to insure) must have been intended to extend to
the employees through whom and for whom the tenant was
responsible.
This presumed intent to benefit the employees in my view
arises from the identification, in this type of case of the
employees with their corporate employer, an identification which
does not occur, for example, between a shipper and an
independant contractor... All duties imposed on the tenant by
the lease are performed by the employees. . . Any right of the
tenant under the lease . . . is enjoyed for the tenant by the
employees and becomes a right of the employees . ." (emphasis
added)
This passage gives rise to what counsel subsequently called the
identification concept: the third party does not exist separately from
the second party for the purposes of the third party beneficiary rule.
The court considered that an imposition of liability on the
employees would be both impractical and surprising; it was
prepared to protect the employees through other avenues if
necessary. 19
The court's reasons sound plausible and legal enough, but a close
examination shows a lack of clarity in the reasoning, little that is
recognizable doctrine, and great liberties taken with the authorities.
It is even uncertain whether the second line of reasoning amplifies
the first line or is an alternative. If it is distinct, it depends in part on
the first line because the intent to benefit the employees is common
to both.
The court brought on the difficulty by not clearly answering the
threshold question, why the tenant is without responsibility.20 Why
the employees are irresponsible must depend, in some way, on why
the tenant is irresponsible. In the course of its judgment, the court
stated that through the lease (a) the tenant received indirect
17. [1978] 2 S.C.R. 749; 92 D.L.R. (3d) 425.
18. (1979), 99 D.L.R. (3d) 289 at 294-5 (N.S.S.C.A.D.).
19. The landlord consented to being injured. The landlord made a gift by deed of
the implied promise not to sue the employees. Id. at 295. As to the former, see
also, Arymowicz, Grand Trunk Railway Company of Canada v. Robinson: Was
Lord Denning Right in Midland Silicones? (1982), 60 C.B. Rev. 467.
20. I use an archaic meaning of "irresponsible" to avoid using a word such as
"exempt" or "immune" which carries with it doctrinal baggage.
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insurance coverage, (b) the tenant was exempted from liability,21
(c) the landlord assumed the risk of loss however arising, and (d) the
landlord promised not to sue the tenant. These are not alternative
modes of expressing one rationale. They raise separate legal
theories which, if they protect the employees, do so for reasons
peculiar to each theory, or because the employees are "identified"
with the tenant who is protected under one of these theories. The
confusion is in part attributable to the uncertainty of the ratio of T.
Eaton, the leading authority for relieving the tenant from liability.
Consider this passage in Laskin, C.J.C.'s judgment in T. Eaton: the
"covenant . . .runs to the benefit of the tenant, lifting from it the
21. It is clear that in T. Eaton, Laskin, C.J.C., writing for the majority, did not
view the lease as exempting the tenant from liability, (1977), 92 D.L.R. (3d) 425 at
430 (S.C.C.). The landlord would have spoiled the insurer's subrogation rights and
voided the policy if the lease had contained an exemption clause of which the
insurer had not been informed. I believe that the Chief Justice saw this problem
lying in wait. He, however, did not articulate any recognizable legal theory through
which the insurer would be obliged to pay on the policy and yet be deprived of
common law rights against the tenant. The conventional reasons are that the tenant
is a co-insured, or that the landlord had fully disclosed to the insurer that he had
reduced their mutual common law rights through the lease. See Lister v. Romford
Ice and Cold Storage Co., [1957] A.C. 555 at 579 (H.L.) (per Viscount Simonds);
Greenwood (1979), 99 D.L.R. (3d) 289 at 292 (N.S.S.C.A.D.) (per McKeigan
C.J.); Sutton, Insurance Law in Australia and New Zealand (1980) at 564-8, and
authorities cited therein.
In an earlier case, Agnew-Surpass Shoe Stores Ltd. v. Cummer-Yonge
Investments Ltd. (1975), 55 D.L.R. (3d) 676 (S.C.C.), Pigeon, Dickson, Beetz
and Ritchie JJ. concurring, took the lease as exculpating the tenant. Laskin C.J.,
Spence and Judson JJ. took the position that there never was any liability on the
tenant in the first place. In T. Eaton, Pigeon, Dickson and Beetz JJ. concurred in
Laskin C.J.'s judgment. Ritchie J. dissented.
As for the insurer's subrogation rights, Laskin C.J.C. writes in T. Eaton (1977),
92 D.L.R. (3d) 425 at 429-30 (S.C.C.):
... as was noted in Cummer-Yonge and Pyrotech ... the matter at hand is
not whether the insurers are being unjustly deprived of their subrogation rights
(as they would be if there was some attempt by the landlord and tenant to agree
on alleviation of the tenant's liability for fire resulting from its negligence after
the fire occurred).
These cases do not discuss whether the insurer might dispute his obligation to pay
on the policy. Notwithstanding the implications of the quoted passage, orthodox
law makes it irrelevant whether the insured gives away his insurer's rights before or
after the accident, but see Sutton, supra. Laskin, C.J.C., who wrote the amorphous
and innovative judgments in the cases on which Greenwood depends and who
seems to have understood and begun to accommodate the ramifications of the fact
situation, was not on the bench in Greenwood.
One way out is to say that the relationship as a matter of law does not admit to a
cause of action against the tenant rather than a particular contract between the
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risk of liability for fire arising from its negligence and bringing that
risk under insurance coverage".22
Whatever may be the Nova Scotia court's ratio for disposing of
either the claim against the tenant or against its employees, the
court's goal is clear. It is also clear that the court understood the
technical objections to the employee's defence. The "identifica-
tion" seems to be the key to overcoming the objections. It is the
reason that the employees were intended as beneficiaries of the
lease, and therefore not "strangers" to the contract, thereby sliding
landlord and tenant excludes a cause of action. This theory is antithetical to the
expressed premises of the whole line of cases. Infra, note 56.
Another way out is to follow one of the several reasons in Morris v. Ford Motor
Co., [1973) 1 Q.B. 792 (C.A.) and say that: (a) the insurer's contract of indemnity
in the particular case does not carry with it the usual right of subrogation or (b) this
right is not available in the case because its exercise would be inequitable.
However, the facts in Morris are highly unusual and Morris may depend on notice
of the non-recourse arrangement between the insured (employer) and his careless
employee.
I do not think that Keefer v. Phoenix Insurance Co. of Hartford (1901), 31 S.C.R.
144 is germane. In Keefer the plaintiff was the vendor of real property which he had
agreed to sell under a contract for deed and keep insured to the extent of the
purchase price. The fire policy was renewed in due course, but the insurer was not
notified of the sale. The insurer's contention was rejected, that its obligation was
only to indemnify Keefer to the extent of his limited interest, being the unpaid
balance. Several ratios can be derived from the case. I do not think that the case
makes the purchaser an insured so that the insurer is saddled with the negligent acts
of a person unknown to the insurer, who came into possession. The issue is more
poignant when the undisclosed interest is small, yet negligently destroys the entire
property. I know of no case involving loss to either realty or chattels which has
used Keefer or its chattel analog, Waters v. Monarch Life and Fire Assurance Co.
(1856), 5 BI. & El. 870; 119 E.R. 705 in this way. The landlord-tenant cases in the
Supreme Court presented such an opportunity and have better facts than Keefer.
The insurer, although he probably did not know the terms of the lease, undoubtedly
knew of the existence of tenants. The correctness of Keefer has been doubted, (see
Baer, Annual Survey of Insurance Law, (1980), 12 Ottawa L. Rev. 610 at 617-22),
but Keefer has been applied in Commerce and Industry Insurance Co. of Canada v.
West EndInvestment Co., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 1036. This case has facts from which it
is difficult to draw a doctrinal generalization. Perhaps it is noteworthy that in this
case the policy named all the relevant interests, albeit inaccurately.
In Commonwealth Construction Co. Ltd. v. Imperial Oil Co. Ltd., [1978] 1 S.C.R.
310; (1977), 69 D.L.R. (3d) 558, involving a builders' risk policy, the
subcontractor in question was a named insured. The Court, rightly or wrongly,
considered the loss to be within the policy terms. It is noteworthy that the Court
recognized that the person who secured the policy had intended to insure the entire
enterprise, and stated that this desire should be effected within the bounds of
doctrine.
22. (1977), 92 D.L.R. (3d) 425 at 428 (S.C.C.).
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over the fact that the employees were not parties to the lease. Since
the employees were identified with the tenant, they did not have to
provide separate consideration and are vicariously immune for
negligence, as well as intentional torts. At the same time,
identification is the reason for excusing the employees on whatever
theory excuses the employer.
Describing the mutuality of interests and the relationship between
tenant and employees as "identification" is novel. 23 The
prerequisites of the association are uncertain, as is its nature. It
seems to be more intense than a mere principal and agent
relationship: the corporation and the employees are manifestations
of each other. In other contexts "identification" is labelled as the
organic theory of corporate responsibility or a piercing of the
corporate veil. The identification concept may even be the T. Eaton
idea expressed differently, or the recognition of a property right in
the employees.
The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal was reversed by the Supreme
Court of Canada. The Court's reasons, briefly, were that the
employees were third party beneficiaries of a contract and they did
not establish either of the circumstances which exclude the
operation of the rule, agency or trust.
Presented with an unclear and technically erroneous judgment
from the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, the Court seems to have
misunderstood both the thrust of the lower court's analysis and its
specifics.
The appellant24, in its rousing and skillful "elucidation" of the
Court, argued in its factum that the Court of Appeal's judgment was
premised on an irrelevancy, namely that the parties intended to
23. But see, Fosbrooke-Hobbes v. Airwork, Ltd., [1937] 1 All E.R. 103 (K.B.);
appld, Cockerton v. Naviera Aznor S.A., [1960] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 450 (Q.B.). In
both cases, the guest of the passenger who purchased the tickets was held bound by
the exculpatory conditions. Without using the word, the court "identified" the
guest with the passenger who was the contracting party. In Cockerton, agency was
given as an alternative basis. Identification seems to slide easily into agency, see
also, Pyrene Co. Ltd. v. Scindia Navigation Co. Ltd., [1954] 2 Q.B. 402. In the
latter case, the vendor and still owner of goods was bound by a carriage contract
made by the purchaser-shipper when the goods were damaged during loading
aboard ship. Fosbrooke-Hobbes and Cockerton have probably not survived
Midland Silicones. Pyrene was accepted as an exceptional instance based on its
facts in Midland Silicones, supra, note 15 at 471 (per Viscount Simonds). See also,
Andrews v. Home Flats Ltd., [1945] 2 All E.R. 698 (C.A.).
24. Appellant's factum to the Supreme Court of Canada at 24-42.
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benefit the employees. The appellant then contended that the sole
reason for disregarding the third party beneficiary rule which could
be extracted from the judgment below was the "identification"
concept. This theory could not be good law. By identifying the
employees with the tenant, the Court of Appeal in effect had
overturned Salomon v. Salomon and Co. Ltd.,1 5 and with a
vengeance! The logical consequence of disregarding the separate
existence of the tenant corporation is an absurdity, that the
employees are responsible for the rent. The appellant ended his
factum by pointing out that the modern history of labour law has not
shown that the interests of labour and management are identical.
The respondents 26 stated the issue broadly: were the employees
entitled to the same protection pursuant to the lease as was available
to the corporate tenant, their employer? The respondents continued,
arguing that the courts below had found as a fact that the landlord
would assume by insurance the risk of loss by fire and would not sue
the tenants or tenants' employees in that event. This finding of fact
was critical and should not be disturbed. The respondents attempted
to give legal significance to this fact by arguing, (a) that Midland
Silicones was distinguishable in Canada because the employees, the
respondents, were claiming the benefit of a clause which protected,
rather than exempted, them, (b) that the tenant contracted as agent
on behalf of the employees, (c) the "identification concept" from
the Court of Appeal's judgment and (d) that the landlord had
vitiated his tort action by consenting in the lease to the employees'
negligence.
The Court agreed that the respondents' case was based on
showing that they were intended to be beneficiaries of the lease:
The respondent contended that the case turned on a finding of fact
made in the courts below that the employees of the tenant were
within the contemplation of the parties when the agreement
regarding insurance . . . was made and they were therefore
entitled to its benefit . . . the employees, if not formal parties to
the contract, were nevertheless intended objects of its benefits
along with the employer and accordingly the trial judgment was
correct.2'7
The Court, however, worked within the appellant's framework.
The Court adopted, indeed quoted, the appellant's statement of the
25. [1897] A.C. 22(H.L.).
26. Respondents' factum to the Supreme Court of Canada at 7-20.
27. (1980), 111 D.L.R. (3d) 257 at 262 (S.C.C.).
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issue for its law and rejected the respondents' case because, in the
opinion of the Court, with two exceptions privity of contract is
necessary despite the contrary intent of the parties to the contract:
It is respectfully submitted that the overwhelming weight of
modem authority, including an applicable series of decisions in
this Court, holds that a person can in no circumstances claim the
benefit of a contract in which he is not a party, unless it is a
contract made on his behalf by his agent, or unless a trust has
been constituted of which he is the beneficiary. 
2 8
The Court showed that neither exception had been established.
The Court understood "identification" to be another way of
saying that the tenant was an agent for the employees. 29 The Court
was unable to infer a link between the employer and the employee
amounting to an agency. Indeed, I suggest that such an inference
would be most unrealistic.
Perhaps the Court also thought that "identification" was itself a
concept and was determined to find for the Nova Scotia Court of
Appeal a respectable basis for its mistaken decision. Therefore it
also concluded, inconsistently, that the Nova Scotia court had found
a trust relationship. But, as the Court wrote:
Upon this point, I must again conclude against the respondents.
We are not referred to any evidence from which a trust could be
inferred. Indeed, the issue of trust does not seem to have been
argued in the courts below, and neither trust nor agency was
pleaded. .. . The contracting parties could surely have altered
the terms (of the lease) without the respondents' consent in this
case. 30
Continuing in the same paragraph, the Court raised, merely to
reject, the respondents' assertion of fact that the lower courts had
found that the employer had intended to benefit the employees. The
Court's purpose seems to have been to undercut the trust theory, but
there is no trace of reliance on a trust anywhere in the lower courts'
judgments or in the factums at any level. The Court could have been
returning to where it began, and was rejecting the basis of the
respondents' case. But the Court had already gone far past this
point, for it had shown that the general intent to benefit a third party
is irrelevant. In any event, the Court upset the finding because:
Courts must, in cases of this sort, be wary against drawing
inferences upon vague and scanty evidence, where the result will
28. Id. at 263.
29. Id. at 264.
30. Id. at 265.
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be to contradict the clear words of a written agreement and where
rectification is not sought or may not be had. 31
The Court then gave its decision, reversing the Court of Appeal.
One can understand the Court's hostility to an argument explicitly
based on the parties' intent to benefit the third party, (although not
its reluctance to make the inference), if the argument had been
made. According to traditional doctrine this intent is relevant if the
action were for a stay of proceedings brought by the second party
against the first, 32 not in the action as constituted, an attempt to
exclude the rule at the insistence of the third party. Indeed, the
whole point of the rule is to defeat this intent, although desire to
effect the parties' intent underlies all the theories which avoid the
rule.
The Court of Appeal in the course of its judgment did journey
into intent suo nomine and tied its statements into precedent by
citing Lord Reid's speech in Midland Silicones. Lord Reid,
however, was speaking about the intent to create an agency, one of
the four requirements of the agency escape. 33 Whatever else the
Court of Appeal may have done, it did not call the employer an
agent.
Despite, or perhaps because of, the "misreading" of authority,
there is much in the Court of Appeal's judgment which commends
it. The result in this area of the law is more significant than its
explanation. In my opinion, the Court of Appeal's instincts for
justice were right and it followed the trend of the law in restricting
the scope of the third party rule. Agreed, identification is a novel
31. Id. at 265-6.
32. The action was denied in Gore v. Van der Lann (Liverpool Corporation
intervening), [1967] 2 Q.B. 31 (C.A.) and permitted in Snelling v. John E.
Snelling Ltd., [1973] Q.B. 87. Beswick v. Beswick, [1968] A.C. 58 (H.L.),
permitting an action for specific performance by the second party in circumstances
in which damages were inadequate may be a watershed. However, the results may
have been motivated by the compulsion of the facts. See also, Hirachand
Punamchand v. Temple, [1911] 2 K.B. 330 (C.A.), in which the court found
numerous means to prevent an Indian money lender from suing his debtor, a British
army officer, for the deficiency after accepting a lesser amount from his father in
satisfaction of the debt, which bore interest at 27% per annum. Some of the reasons
were that (a) the promissory note from the son had ceased to exist, (b) the creditor
would receive the money as a trustee for the father, so there was no point in
permitting the action, (c) the action would be a fraud on the father, (d) the action
was an abuse of process. This "type transaction" is not classified as a third party
beneficiary case (Snelling, supra, at 99), although this analysis can be run.
33. [1962] A.C. 446 at474.
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rationalization, but it is a cogent and serviceable enough concept.
The court misused authority, but as an intermediate court of appeal,
it has a limited role in making new law. This was not the first time
that a court has masked doctrinal impediments with faulty analysis
and thereby advanced the law. Nor did the prior judgments of the
Supreme Court give the court much assistance in finding reasons
which would better withstand a close textual analysis.
Thus, the Court of Appeal wrote a judgment which appears to be
within established confines, but a closer examination shows that it
does not contain any recognizable conventional doctrine. This
approach to law-making has inherent dangers, and the Supreme
Court succumbed to them. It failed to understand the Court of
Appeal, and the appellant diverted the Court with familiar doctrine.
III. Greenwood as a Third Party Beneficiary Case
To say, as the Court did, 34 that C cannot derive rights enforceable
against A from a contract made by A and B is to postulate a
far-reaching and impractical rule which either has little moral basis
or is morally offensive. The third party beneficiary rule can be
stated more narrowly. But however one states the rule, it is an
abstraction which at best is a bureaucratic and inexact manifestation
of values. The situation sense flowing from diverse factual patterns
and relationships, not doctrinal abstractions, dictates legal reality
for the most part. Consequently C generally does have enforceable
rights. 35 Ideas such as negotiation, assignment, attornment,
subrogation, corporation, trust, partnership and agency came into
the law prior to the third party beneficiary rule and have been
perceived as existing in relative isolation. 36 Sight is sometimes lost
34. (1980), 111 D.L.R. (3d) 257 at 263 (S.C.C.).
35. See generally, Dowrick, A Jus Quaesitum Tertio by Way of Contract in
English Law (1956), 19 M.L.R. 374 at 375-7.
36. There are other "anomalies" in the law. Consignees can sue on a bill of lading
as if they were parties, e.g., The Mercantile Law AmendmentAct., R.S.O. 1970, c.
272, s.7(l); Bills ofLading Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 22, s. 1. Subsequent transferees
can sue on a deed, e.g. The Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, R.S.O. 1970,
c. 85, s. 23(3); R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 56, ss. 5(c); cf. Law of Property Act 1925, 15 &
16 Geo. 5, c. 20, s. 56 (U.K.). A mortgagee can sue the mortgagor's grantee on the
convenant, if the grantee has assumed the mortgage, Adair v. Carden (1892), 29
L.R.I.R. 469 (Ch.); The Mortgages Act R.S.O. 1970, c. 279, s. 19. No one has
argued that a bank issuing a letter of credit can defend against a beneficiary on the
basis of lack of privity. A person with a limited interest in property can insure for
the benefit of the remaining interests, Keefer v. The Phoenix Insurance Co. of
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practical effect, and their relationship to the rule. Techniques such
as "joint promisee" also take cases outside the rule, 37 as does the
second party's ability to enforce the contract through an action for
specific performance, a stay of proceedings, or substantial
damages.
The classifications and remedies expand or contract like an
accordion to give the rule a variable reach. 38 Sometimes
Hartford, supra, note 21; Hepburn v. A. Tomlinson (Hauliers) Ltd., [1966] A.C.
452 (H.L.). The creditor cannot renege after accepting payment of a lesser amount
from a stranger in consideration of extinguishing the debt, Hirachand Punamchand
v. Temple, [1911] 2 K.B. 330 (C.A.).
Building schemes have been enforced for over a century. The "convenant running
to the tenant" (sic) to insure in T. Eaton v. Smith circumvents the rule. A third
party can rely on the contract to establish a status other than trespasser, Grand
Trunk Railway v. Robinson, [1915] A.C. 740 (P.C. Can.). Deposit of goods to a
bailee to hold for a third party constitutes delivery to the third party. For more
examples, see also, Alder v. Dickson, [1955] 1 Q.B. 158, at 200 (C.A.)(per Morris
L.J.).
In Ross v. Caunters, [ 1980] Ch. 297, a solicitor negligently permitted a beneficiary
to witness a will. He was held liable at the suit of the disappointed beneficiary. It is
tempting to say that this case stands for the proposition that the first party owes the
third party a duty not to perform negligently.
It is worthwhile to consider: (a) whether the third party can stop the first party from
reneging on his promise not to sue or to limit his claim despite the lack of a prior
contractual nexus between the parties (see e.g., In re William Porter and Co. Ltd.,
[1937] 2 All E.R. 361 (Ch.)), or (b), whether the first party's statements will
support an action in misrepresentation by the third party.
37. See, Cardozo J.'s tour de force in De Cicco v. Schweizer (1917), 221 N.Y.
431; 117 N.E. 807; Coote, Consideration and the Joint Promisee (1978), 37 Cam.
L. 301, and cases cited therein. See also, New Zealand Shipping Co. Ltd. v. A.M.
Satterthwaite and Co. Ltd., [1974] A.C. 154 (P.C.N.Z.), another triumph of
technique, featuring unilateral contract and agency.
Professor Coote contends that the "joint promisee" device should not succeed
because it cannot "stand in the face of classical notions of consideration" (at 303),
referring to Dunlop Tyre Co. Ltd. v. Selfridge and Co., [1915] A.C. 847 (H.L.). A
party to a contract is someone who is in privity and has provided consideration.
Professor Coote is correct insofar as he goes. But these "classical notions" were
expressed at one point in time - and quite late - in the history of the common
law. They are the products of a particular Weltanschauung and respond to
particular concerns. Also, the law has slid over greater and more obvious
difficulties, see e.g., Slade's Case (1602), 4 Co. Rep. 92b; 76 E.R. 1074 (K.B.).
"Classical notions" are therefore only the starting point for discussion. See also,
Corbin, Contractsfor the Benefit of Third Persons (1930), 46 L.Q.R. 12.
38. Compare DeCicco v. Schweizer, id. with Re Schebsman, [1943] 2 All E.R.
768 (C.A.). In Re Schebsman the court found that a trust had not been created.
Perhaps it is significant that it was the second party's Trustee in Bankruptcy who
attempted to construe the transaction as a trust? If it were a trust, then it was
imperfectly constituted, giving, it was claimed, the Trustee in Bankruptcy the right
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transactions raise facts which no theory, applied ex post facto, can
possibly encompass, but this exclusion comes from an accidental
mismatch between facts and doctrine, and not from the lack of merit
in the case. 39 Careful and imaginative draftsmen can defeat the rule,
perhaps in all cases. 40 Finally, when the legislature has perceived a
to divert the payments from the wife and child to the creditors. Green v. Russell,
[1959] 2 Q.B. 226 (C.A.) also does not present facts which should move the
court's conscience towards finding a trust. See also, In re Webb, Barclay's Bank
Ltd. v. Webb, [1941] Ch. 225; Re Foster Clark Indenture Trusts, Loveland v.
Horscroft, [1966] 1 All E.R. 43 (Ch.).
The Court in Greenwood accepted the finding of a trust in Les Affrdteurs Rjunis
Socidtd Anonyme v. Ljopold Walford (London) Ltd., [1919] A.C. 801 (H.L.) at
face value, but see, Swan and Reiter, Developments in Contract Law: 1979-80
Term (1981), 2 S.C.L. Rev. 125 at 141-4.
The Privy Council, in New Zealand Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Satterthwaite and Co.
Ltd., id. on strong facts found that the rule did not apply because the second party
had contracted as agent for the third party in a unilateral contract. The cases now
are about whether the facts raise the inference of agency. The third party has not
had much success thus far, but this is of little consequence. The common law
traditionally develops by, initially, only grudgingly finding facts to fit new theory
(or to be more accurate, retreaded theory). In time the allegations become pro
forma.
39. E.g. Jackson v. Horizon Holiday's Ltd., [1975] 3 All E.R. 92 (C.A.);
Greenwood Shopping Plaza Ltd. v. Beattie (1980), 111 D.L.R. (3d) 257 (S.C.C.).
The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal showed with the "identification" idea that
necessity is the mother of doctrine.
40. The New Zealand Shipping agency device has had a cool reception. See
generally, Tetley, The Himalaya Clause -Heresy or Genius?, (1977-78) J. Mar.
Law and Com. 111; Reynolds, Again the Negligent Stevedore (1979), 95 L.Q.R.
183; but see, Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty. Ltd. v. Salmond & Spraggon
(Australia) Pty. Ltd., [1980] 2 All E.R. 257 (P.C. Aust.). But draftsmen have not
exhausted the inventory. If the second party can extract the promise to relieve the
third party, he can also extract a promise that the first party will hold all insurance
proceeds arising from the third parties' injury to the goods on trust for the third
party. The draftsmen perhaps have worked the agency backwards thus far. The
second party should not be the agent for the third party, but the agent for the first
party. The terms of this agency should expressly enable the second party to contract
with the third party and release him from certain obligations. Another approach is
to have the second party take an assignment from the first party of certain causes of
action against the third. Failing all else, the second party can constitute itself an
agent of the third party and take a release under seal of rights against the third party.
Alternatively, the second party could agree to indemnify the third party and insure
against this potential liability. The premium should be small, for the second party
has standing to enjoin the suit against the third party and the policy can be placed
with the third party's liability insurer. If the second party's suit against the first
party (to which the insurer will be subrogated) is for damages, the damages will at
least equal the third party's liability.
Lord Reid suggested that the second party indemnify the third and contract with the
first party to release the third, telling the first party of the indemnity. Damages will
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relationship as important enough, it has not been content to wait for
the outcome of the war of attrition between the draftsman and the
judiciary; it has enacted exceptions to the rule.
4 '
The present limited scope of the rule makes it obsolete as a rule of
general application, if it ever had such currency. Continuing the rule
in its present form should not be tolerated because it does positive
harm notwithstanding that it can be avoided easily. The rule obliges
the parties to enter into artifical legal relationships with enormous
consequences. The rule catches the unwary who are often deserving
of legal protection. Making legal rights dependent on drafting
gamesmanship and counsel's imagination detracts from predictabil-
ity in business and weakens the law's claim for legitimacy. As for
the rule's benefits in policing bargains, these can be preserved.
42
The Supreme Court need not have enshrined the rule in its broad
form given the objections to the rule and its history. The Court
offset each other. Scruttons Ltd. v. Midland Silicones Ltd., [1962] A.C. 446 at 478
(H.L.).
In all cases in which the second party takes rights in its own name, further steps
need to be taken to guard against the contingency of the second party's going
bankrupt. The Trustee in Bankruptcy, in liquidating the estate, would not be
obliged to exercise these rights for the benefit of the third party or to pass along any
proceeds to the third party. The bankrupt probably must also establish a trust of
these rights, and this trust must survive the Trustee's attempts to avoid the
transaction.
Assuming that the second party is and stays solvent, perhaps there is a simpler
solution. Can the second party announce the day after the accident that he is
holding the promise to exempt the third party on trust for the third? In the cases that
come to mind, it was argued only that the second party was a trustee at the time of
contracting.
Some of these approaches are discussed by Rose, Return to Elder Dempster?
(1975), 4 Anglo-American L. Rev. 7. This excellent piece discusses the New
Zealand Shipping case.
41. Supra, note 36.
42. One must take care in tinkering with something as intricate as the common
law. The third party rule preserves rights as well as prevents them from arising. (a)
Modem contracting practices manifesting themselves in the standard form leave the
enterprise immune. The third party rule prevents the enterprise from passing on the
immunity to the employees. (See e.g. Alder v. Dickson, supra, note 36).
Consequently, employers often make some arrangement so that the employee does
not suffer the judgment personally. Through such a convolution the rule at times
produces a desirable result. (b) The rule prevents, for example, a manufacturer of
goods from passing along his exculpation clauses to others in the chain of
distribution. Each subsequent transferee must also devise a contract which will
withstand challenge. (c) In "joint beneficiary" cases, the noncontracting party may
not have the benefit of any warranties, but the burden of the exculpations does not
constrain his tort action.
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might have performed its function in a number of ways, even by
refusing leave to appeal Greenwood. Having taken the case, the
Court could have (a) affirmed, stretching the conventional escapes,
(b) affirmed, giving no reasons or adopting the Court of Appeal's
reasons, (c) re-classified the case as a landlord-tenant, etc. case and
decided accordingly. Most significantly, the Court would not have
been presumptuous had it (d) used the case as a vehicle to restate the
third party beneficiary rule so that it would correspond with
legitimate public expectations and the reality of its limited
relevance. The Court instead engaged in a passive and insensitive
exercise in formalism. The Court did not question the comprehen-
siveness of the rule; it applied the rule as if it had no history and no
future, as if it had crystallized immutably, and in Westminster.
Furthermore, there is no reference in its unanimous judgment to
fifty years of commentators' criticism, recommendations of various
law reform commissions, and the fact that life goes on in the United
States with the rule substantially abrogated.
4 3
The Court viewed its course as dictated by its decision in
Canadian General Electric Co. Ltd. v. Pickford and Black Ltd. 4
One cannot quarrel with stare decisis as a general precept.
Adherence to stare decisis is a particularly wholesome practice
when a case decided as recently as Canadian General Electric is
impugned. But it would be unfortunate if the Court's passing
reference in this case to Scruttons Ltd. v. Midland Silicones Ltd.
indicates the extent that it will debate whether it should follow
British courts. Ironically, British courts seem to be becoming less
doctrinaire in contract cases. They are beginning to show openly
43. American law distinguishes between creditor-beneficiaries and donee-
beneficiaries. The former have legat rights under the contract. Murray on Contracts
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril, 1974) s. 278.
44. [1971] S.C.R. 41; (1970), 14 D.L.R. (3d) 372. Canadian General Electric is
another stevedore's case. The substantial issue was whether the stevedores were
negligent. But see, Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty. Ltd. v. Salmond & Spraggon
(Australia) Pty. Ltd., [1980] 2 All E.R. 257 (P.C. Aust.).
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intolerance towards the third party beneficiary rule, 45 and creativity
in contract law in general.
46
The Court seems to be following the letter and not the spirit of the
British courts' judgments, and from a case more than a generation
old. Such a course is particularly distressing in a time when
increasingly, Commonwealth courts cannot look to British courts
for leadership. The British Parliament is reforming large areas of
private law. At times perhaps the British courts' decision are
unreliable. Knowing that Parliament is relatively responsive,
perhaps the British courts have made law passively. They have
deliberately followed set doctrine so that the unpalatable results
would spur Parliament into action. 47 Where will we be if the British
Parliament finally intervenes and reforms the third party beneficiary
rule?
The sterility of the Court's analysis is apparent if the facts are
changed in a way which is doctrinally irrelevant to its reasons.
Suppose, for example, that the corporate tenant is a one person
corporation, and the fire was started negligently by its sole
employee, the owner.48 Or that the fire was started by the owner's
spouse, who worked part time. Or the owner's child, who was
helping out without pay. The Court wrote that the employees were
not protected because a trust or an agency on their behalf could not
be inferred. Surely in this context, the pith of the matter is the
45. Hepburn v. A. Tomlinson (Hauliers), supra, note 36; Beswick v. Beswick,
supra, note 32; Jackson v. Horizon Holidays Ltd., supra, note 39; Woodwar
Investment Development Ltd. v. Wimpey Construction U.K. Ltd., [1980] 1 All
E.R. 571 (H.L.).
In Hepburn, supra, at 471, Lord Reid said, "No doubt the principle preventingjus
quaesitum tertio has been firmly established for at least half a century. But it does
not appear to me a primeval or a necessary principle of the law of England. We
must uphold it until it is altered. But I do not think that we are bound to be astute to
extend it on a logical basis, so as to cut down an exception, if it be an exception,
(of) . . .more than a century ago.
46. E.g., Woodwar Investment Development Ltd. v. Wimpey Construction U.K.
Ltd., id.; Pao On v. Lau Yui Long, [1980] A.C. 614 (P.C.); Johnson v. Agnew,
[1980] A.C. 367 (H.L.).
47. Two of the best examples are Crown liability and matrimonial property rights.
See, Lord Denning, Freedom Under the Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1949) at
73; Blom-Cooper and Drewry, Final Appeal (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972) at
307.
48. Lee v. Lee's Air Farming Ltd., [1961] A.C. 12 (P.C.N.Z.).
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relationships among the parties and nature of the conduct. 49 What
other facts could anyone hope to adduce? To find an agency or a
trust is to engage in fantasy;50 the rule might as well be struck down
openly. The tenant has no understanding of such legal concepts. He
understands tires and batteries. 51 After hearing a description of
these concepts, it would be a surprise if he said that he intended to
enter into the requisite relationships. If the tenant had had enough
understanding and foresight to think of agency or trust, he also
would have known not to rely on these concepts. He would have
insisted that the policy name both him and his employees as
insureds. As for inferring a trust from the facts, as the Court itself
stated, surely the tenant could have agreed to leave the employees
liable to the landlord. Who would ever advise the employees, that
they, as cestuis que trust, could enjoin their employer from
changing such a lease? If the tenant had any intent, 52 it was to
protect his employees by means of the insurance policy. How silly
of the tenant to think that his desires and expectations could be
fulfilled simply, directly, and without sham.
49. The bailment relationship suffices when the insurance is on goods. The bailee
can insure the goods for their entire value. He holds amounts in excess of the value
of his interest in trust for the other persons interested. The insurance does not
depend on the bailee's acting as agent or trustee. Waters v. Monarch Fire & Life
Assurance Co. (1856), 5 El. & Bl. 870; 119 E.R. 750; Hepburn v. A. Tomlinson
(Hauliers) Ltd., supra, note 36. The insurer must prove that the bailee did not
intend to insure the other interests. Hepburn, supra, note 36 at 482 (per Lord
Pearce).
50. Jackson v. Horizon Holidays Ltd., supra, note 39 at 95 per Lord Denning. See
also, Vandepitte v. Preferred Accident Insurance Corporation of New York, [1933]
A.C. 70 at 77 (P.C. Can.) "But a contract can arise only if there is the animus
contrahendi between the parties; there is here no evidence that Jean Berry had any
conception of any contract of insurance". Also, the principal (employees) must
provide consideration, Dunlop Tyre Co. Ltd. v. Selfridge and Co. Ltd., supra, note
37.
51. To be truthful, Neil Buchanan, the principal shareholder of the tenant, is a
chartered accountant. There is, however, testimony that he had a general intent to
prevent litigation. Factum of the Respondent to the Supreme Court at 10.
52. The President of Greenwood stated on discovery as follows: "Our only
concern, Sir, in this whole operation is to continue on in the business of what we
have been doing. We are not interested in lawsuits, lawyers, and such, period."
Quoted at Respondents' factum to the Supreme Court of Canada at 10. It is
unrealistic to investigate intent. I suspect that the average tenant bound to a 40 page
commercial lease thinks of little more than how much rent he pays, the length of his
term, his permitted use, whether his use is exclusive and the like. Therefore,
commentators talk about the intent that can be inferred from the transaction. It is
more accurate and useful to ask what rights flow from the relationship. Stating the
law in terms of intent sidetracks the issue and sends it to its ultimate derailment.
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IV. Greenwood as a Landlord-Tenant or Insurance Case
Under orthodox doctrine the tenant is liable for its waste and the
tenant is not a co-insured under the landlord's policy unless it is
specifically included. The cases culminating with T. Eaton v. Smith
emphasize provisions in leases which were previously considered
irrelevant, and allocate risk of loss in a way which changes the
incidents of the landlord-tenant and insurance relationships. 53 The
judgments in these cases are confused because the results are not
explicable through conventional doctrine and the courts were
unwilling to give up the premises which the results contradict,
namely, the tenant is liable for waste and is not a co-insured. 54 The
ratio of T. Eaton need not be clear when the tenant alone is being
sued, because a court can dispose of the case giving little in the way
of reasons other than to say that it is applying or refusing to apply T.
Eaton. However, the exact basis of the decision must be ascertained
in at least three cases: (a) the landlord's property insurer claims
contribution from the tenant's liability insurer, (b) the insurer claims
that the landlord voided the policy by putting the tenant out of
reach, and (c) the insurer sues the tenant's employees. The first two
cases have not yet arisen. Greenwood is the third. The Nova Scotia
53. The principal provision is the landlord's promise to insure the building. Ross
Southward Tire Ltd. v. Pyrotech Products Ltd., supra, note 2, Agnew-Surpass
Shoe Stores Ltd. v. Cummer-Yonge Investment Ltd., supra, note 16; T. Eaton Co.
v. Smith, supra, note 2.
In United Motor Services Inc. v. Hutson, [1937] S.C.R. 294; (1937] I D.L.R. 737
the landlord promised to pay insurance premiums. This case seems to be directly
against the tenant. Laskin, C.I.C., in Agnew-Surpass Shoe Stores, supra, note 16
at 685 and T. Eaton, supra, note 2 at 432 distinguished Hutson on the basis that the
effect of the provision obligating the landlord to pay the premiums was not
discussed. I suggest that the Court in Hutson did not discuss the clause because it
assumed it to be irrelevant and Hutson became authority on this point.
Hutson has probably been implicitly overruled. Regardless of what Hutson stands
for, it behooved draftsmen to express their intentions fully and exactly. The
landlord's promise to pay the insurance can simply be part of a detailing of the
responsibility for the expenses of the building. The lease may obligate the landlord
to insure in order to fund the landlord's obligation to repair the premises, with the
lease terminating (for the protection of both parties) if the building cannot be
repaired within a stipulated period. After the fire the parties debate the purpose of
inconsistent boiler plate clauses which relate to an unlikely contingency and were
substantially overlooked as the parties negotiated about the rent, term of lease and
other more immediate concerns. The argument that the landlord's promise to insure
was ascribable to some reason other than relief of the tenant was rejected in T.
Eaton. Laskin, C.J.C., placed the burden on proving a different purpose on the
landlord, at 429.
54. Supra, p. 7.
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courts finessed the problem by identifying the employees with the
tenant; whatever the tenant got, the employees got. The Supreme
Court decided Greenwood as if T. Eaton had gone the other way:
the Court unhesitatingly excluded one of the participants in the joint
enterprise from the insurance coverage.
But to say, as the Court did, that the employees are third party
beneficiaries to a contract begs the question: what are the
relationships between the insurer, landlord and tenant, and what are
their incidents? Have the principles governing the relationships
changed pursuant to T. Eaton, so that the employees are within the
principles as well? If the tenant is the equivalent of a co-insured,
then Greenwood is Lister v. Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co. Ltd.
in disguise, a notorious employee's liability case (which I shall
discuss shortly). Should Lister be part of the law of Canada? If the
tenant qua tenant is not responsible for waste, why should the
irresponsibility not extend to the employees? After all, corporations
cannot start fires without some intervention by their employees. If
the tenant is irresponsible because it is exempt, should the law know
a doctrine of vicarious immunity as the converse of vicarious
liability? Only if the answers to all the questions are adverse to the
employees, does a court have to consider the employees as third
party beneficiaries, and unprotected, unless the court engages in the
machinations associated with the third party beneficiary rule.
T. Eaton is not a difficult and confusing case if its ostensible
doctrinal suppositions are rejected. What T. Eaton works towards is
that the party with insurance coverage - in T. Eaton the landlord
- bears the loss whether caused by the landlord or the tenant. 55 The
55. The cases thus far do depend on the landlord's promise to insure. I will argue
subsequently that it is not useful to make rights depend on this promise. However,
it is not surprising that the law is changing along such an avenue as the landlord's
promise and that it has not abandoned the promise as yet. Change in the law is often
incremental, along the path of least resistance, and confused. Only after a period is
the law consolidated and put on its "true" basis, e.g., Rylands v. Fletcher,
[1865-75] L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (per Blackburn, J.), affd., [1865-75] L.R. 3 H.L. 330;
Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.) (per Lord Atkin); United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corporation (1941), 315 U.S. 289 (per Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
See also, Baer, The Importance of Insurance in Interpreting Exclusion Clauses
(19g1), 6 Can. Bus. Law 3. 97 at 103. "A more appropriate, evenhanded approach
to the allocation of risk has been adopted by Laskin, C.J.C., in interpreting leases,
although he has not set out in detail all of the insurance matters which would
support his conclusion."
Commonwealth Construction Co. Ltd. v. Imperial Oil Ltd., supra, note 21 and
Commerce and Industry Insurance Co. et al. v. West End Investment Co., supra,
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Court of Appeal's judgment in Greenwood is confusing because it
ostensibly is based on the ostensible doctrine in T. Eaton rather than
its reality. The reasons which make the change in the incidents of
the landlord-tenant relationship appropriate in T. Eaton also lead to
the conclusion that the insurer, stymied against the tenant, should
not be able to assert against the employees a tort action through the
landlord or an indemnity action through the tenant (at least for acts
done within the scope of employment). If these changes were
openly accepted into doctrine, doctrine would conform to the
common desires and expectations of those whom it affects.
Furthermore, it would correspond to business reality; its substance
is already put into practice by the well-advised, and without
argument from landlords or insurance companies.
However, businessmen must travel a tortuous path to insure that
the insurance company which has received a premium for a risk will
absorb the loss, rather than a participant in the insured transaction.
The starting point is, of course, the black letter rule that the tenant is
liable for waste caused by its negligence. The first step is a tenant's
covenant to repair, excepting damage caused by fire. Such a
covenant, however, does not extend to damage caused by the
tenant's negligence unless negligence is specifically excepted. If the
clause does not extend to negligence, the tenant should take out
liability insurance; he will be indemnified. Generally, the landlord
insures against fire regardless of what the lease says about the
tenant's liability or whether the tenant insures. If the landlord is the
named insured under the fire policy and the tenant can bring himself
within the delphic judgments of T. Eaton v. Smith, he is
irresponsible. However, the landlord has voided the policy if he
destroys without the insurer's consent its subrogation rights by (a)
note 21 support the argument insofar as they are cases in which the Court has
ignored basic rules of insurance law in order to make the property insurer accept the
loss, thereby fulfilling the expectations of the various parties jointly engaged in a
transaction involving the property. Baer points out the doctrinal difficulties in these
cases in Baer, Annual Survey of Insurance Law (1980), 12 Ottawa L. Rev. 610 at
617-22, 656-63.
Risk of loss following insurance coverage is provided for the Uniform Commercial
Code 2-509, 2-510, particularly 2-510 (2) and (3) and The Personal Property
Security Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 344, ss.19(2), as amended. Courts have obtained
assistance from statutes in cases outside their scope, if only to tell which way the
wind is blowing. See e.g. Pettkus v. Becker (1981), 117 D.L.R. (3d) (S.C.C.)
(division of property between co-habitees), and generally, Landis, Statutes and the
Sources of Law, Harvard Legal Essays, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1934) at 213.
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releasing the tenant from liability for negligence, (b) agreeing to
deny the insurer subrogation rights, and, I suggest, even by (c) "T.
Eaton v. Smith" clauses. 56 Of course, the landlord could have the
tenant added as a co-insured. This can be done at no extra cost in
many commercial policies. The complex provisions in the litigated
cases suggest that this course has been overlooked.
The next step after protecting the tenant is to protect his
employees. Given Lister and now Greenwood, well-advised
employees or their union will bargain to vitiate the employees'
potential liability by (a) having the employer (i) waive his indemnity
rights against the employees and (ii) adopt further means to protect
the employees against a direct suit by the landlord, (b) having the
employer agree to indemnify the employee, (c) having the employer
agree to arrange for (i) full liability coverage, for himself and (ii) the
insurers' waiver of subrogation rights, 57 or (d) having the employer
provide insurance coverage for the employees. Each route has its
own pitfalls 58 and must be negotiated properly.
At the end of the journey the building at last is at an insurer's risk.
But without reform, the law traps the unwary and creates legal
distinctions, litigation, 59 up to three premiums for one risk, and
subrogation windfalls.
56. [1978)2 S.C.R. 749; 92 D.L.R. (3d) 425.
57. See, Morris v. Ford Motor Co. Ltd., [1973] 1 Q.B. 792 (C.A.).
58. In Morris v. Ford Motor Co. Ltd., id., the plaintiff, an employee of an
independent contractor retained by Ford to clean the factory was injured by an
employee of Ford. The cleaners had agreed to indemnify Ford for the negligence of
Ford's employees causing loss to the cleaner's employees. The plaintiff, the
employee of the cleaners, sued Ford, who joined in as third parties the cleaners for
indemnity, who joined in as a fourth party by way of subrogation Ford's negligent
employee.
For example: (a) It is assumed that the subrogation action succeeds. Add the fact
that the employer Ford agreed to indemnify the employee. How would the circle be
broken? (b) Promises to be meaningful have to be backed up by an ability to pay.
What if the employer-tenant promises to indemnify the employee but goes
bankrupt? Insolvency is a significant risk considering the coincidence of fire and
bankruptcy. (c) These alternatives are done defectively so as not to create
obligations.
59. The trial judgment begins with a description of the litigations resulting from
the fire, (1978), 31 N.S.R. (2d) 1 (N.S.S.C.T.D.). Imposing liability on the
employees can trigger a new round of litigation depending on the arrangements that
were made between the parties.
Some of the more interesting questions that can be raised from the facts are: (a) Did
the landlord void the policy by vitiating subrogation rights against the tenant? (b)
Did the tenant know that the landlord's rights had been improperly affected and
does such knowledge restore the insurer to his rights? (c) Can the landlord's insurer
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The rules, which are the starting points in journey, now conflict
with widely held views of responsibility. The tenant's liability may
have been appropriate when insurance was uncommon, tenants
generally occupied the entire premises and the value of the premises
was minor in comparison to the estate. These are not today's
circumstances. Except in most unusual cases, the landlord has
insured-and probably over-insured-the premises. Most property
is mortgaged and the mortgagee always insists on an insurance
policy in which he is loss payee. 60 Most often he has insisted that
the face amount of the policy equal the mortgage principal,
notwithstanding that the principal exceeds the value of the structures
and that all the insurer will give is indemnity. Although the landlord
is usually the named insured, the tenant is not a disinterested
"stranger" to the policy. In reality the tenant may well have a
greater interest than the landlord, because, unless the lease provides
otherwise, the destruction of the premises by fire does not frustrate
the lease and end the obligation to pay rent. 61 Also, the tenant is
vitally interested in reconstruction of the premises. Not only will he
get premises, in addition to an estate, for his rent, but his goodwill
and investment in the equipment, improvements and inventory may
have value only if the premises are expeditiously rebuilt. The tenant
may be obligated to rebuild pursuant to the lease. The tenant also is
concerned that the insurer not have rights against his employees in
order that he may have peace with his employees or their union.
Furthermore, it is the tenant who actually pays the insurance
claim contribution from the tenant's liability insurer? (d) One would be naive to
think that the tenant corporation conducted its affairs after the fire in such a way as
to increase the assets exigible on execution. Can the landlord, as a creditor, claim
that the tenant corporation owed it a fiduciary duty, and the corporation's actions
amounted to a breach of duty? (Rustop Ltd. Estate v. White, Bower (1980), 36
N.S.R. (2d) 207 (N.S.S.C.A.D.); Western Finance Co. Ltd. v. Tasker Enterprises
Ltd. (1979), 1 Man. R. (2d) 338 (Man C.A.); Walker v. Winbourne, [1976]
A.L.J.R. 446; Canada Business Corporation Act, R.S.C. 1974-5, c. 33, s. 234, as
amended.)
60. A common argument against permitting the insurer subrogation is that the
insurer excludes subrogation recoveries in determining premiums. This argument
has a greater weight when combined with the fact that insurers do not charge for a
mortgagee clause. In this clause the insurer promises to pay the mortgagee, despite
conduct on the part of the insured mortgagor which would void the policy against
him. It is noteworthy that insurers do not assert third party beneficiary as a defence
to an action based on a mortagee clause.
61. But see, National Carriers Ltd. v. Panalpina (Northern) Ltd., [19813 1 All
E.R. 161 (H.L.).
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premiums, either openly if the lease is net-net or implicitly as part
and parcel of the rent.
The tenants, who in the previous insurance cases established that
the lease made them irresponsible, owe much of their success to the
happenstance of the wording of the lease. They would have spoken
to the matter directly had they thought that the wording of the lease
would have the importance attributed to it by the Court. Yet they
succeeded. The allocation of risk in a commercial tenancy should
not depend on drafting accidents.
As for residential tenants, they are even less likely to carry
liability insurance to cover loss of the entire apartment building and
lost business income. Because standard form residential leases do
not attempt to balance interests, they are less likely to have
individually and imprecisely drawn clauses with the potential for
happy surprises. Residential tenants also pay for the insurance
premiums. Indeed, landlords present rent review boards with
insurance bills in order to justify their proposed rent increases.
In either tenancy, it is much more likely that a tenant, rather than
the landlord, will bring the risk of fire to fruition. What space does
the landlord occupy in an apartment building, office building, or
shopping centre? What is the nature of his activities? How often will
the fire be caused by deficiencies in the construction of a modem
building?
The modernization of landlord and tenant law, evident in
Highway Properties Ltd. v. Kelly, Douglas Co. Ltd.6 2 and in the
cases culminating in T. Eaton, should be continued. Risk of loss
should rest on the party who has effective insurance coverage
regardless of "fault" with a pro rata sharing of risk if there is
multiple coverage. Any excess loss should be on the person causing
the fire within the present rules. Only conduct tantamount to arson
should change the result between the parties. T. Eaton goes a good
distance to such a position.
V. Greenwood as an Employee's Liability Case
Corporations act through their employees. If contract or law make
the corporate employer irresponsible, why should the irresponsibil-
ity not extend to the employees as a general rule? I will sketch how
the Court might have relieved the employees of liability by some
62. [1971] S.C.R. 562; 17 D.L.R. (3d) 701, Laskin J. for the Court.
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way other than changing a landlord-tenant rule or fantasizing an
agency or trust.
First, assume that the Court thought that the lease exempted the
tenant. 63 The Court could have protected the employees by
accepting vicarious immunity for negligent acts. In one sense, it
would not have introduced a novelty. Many of the legal
contrivances which avoid the third party rule create this result
indirectly and unreliably. English case law rejected such a theory
erroneously, and without sufficient reflection. 64 It need not have
been followed.
If, however, the lease as construed gives the tenant a positive
benefit, rather than relief from liability, the question of vicarious
immunity does not arise. The third party beneficiary rule
substitutes. Such a characterization perhaps would go a way
towards avoiding the underlying unarticulated problem, the
insurer's claim against the landlord that the landlord voided the
policy by spoiling the subrogation rights. However, while the
characterization protects the landlord, this problem and its solution
should not determine the important and independent question of the
employee's liability.
If the Court were committed to the benefit characterization, it
could still relieve the employees. It would first have to accept the
easy inference from the facts, which the Court rejected and then
assumed arguendo, that the tenant contracted for a benefit for both
himself and his employees. With this view of the facts and the sense
of the case, the Court need not have shaped the case with the "rigid
mould of the concept of privity". 65 The Court could have collected
and rationalized the cases in which one party contracts for
performance to be rendered to both himself and another. 66 The law
63. But see supra, note 24.
64. I argue this point in a comment based on Grand Trunk Railway Company of
Canada Ltd. v. Robinson, [1915] A.C.740 (P.C. Can.), (1982), 60 C.B.R. 467.
65. (1980), 111 D.L.R. (3d) 257 at 263 (S.C.C.).
66. Examples are collected in Coote, Consideration and the Joint Promisee
(1978), 37 Cam. L.J. 301, 303. To the list can be added holidays, Jackson v.
Horizon Holidays Ltd., supra, note 39; insurance, T. Eaton Co. Ltd. v. Smith,
supra, note 2; vendors' agent's commission on sale of land to be paid to company
unconnected with vendors but connected with agent, Woodwar Investment
Development Ltd. v. Wimpey Construction U.K. Ltd., supra, note 45.
Some of the unresolved questions are (a) are damages nominal? (b) is specific
performance available only when the consideration has passed to the first party? (c)
if the contract is to relieve the third party, is a stay of proceedings available? The
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is ready for such a consolidation. I suggest that even "hard liners"
on third party beneficiary would agree that "joint beneficiary"
cases warrant special treatment. Courts now scramble to protect the
third parties. The principal theoretical solution - an action brought
by the second party to effect the contract by an order for specific
performance, an injunction, a stay of proceedings or damages
exposes great deficiencies in the law of remedies.
67
views differ: note 32 Gore v. Van der Lann (Liverpool Corporation intervening)
[1967] 2 Q.B. 31 (C.A.); Beswick v. Beswick, supra, note 32; Snelling v. John E.
Snelling Ltd., supra, note 32; Gasparini v. Gasparini (1978), 20 O.R. (2d) 113; 87
D.L.R. (3d) 282 (C.A.); Jackson, id.; Woodwar, id. If damages are substantial,
there are further questions: (d) Can the second party keep the award? I would think
that a court would interfere and oblige the money to be passed on by some theory.
Damages are substantial because the third party has suffered, not the second. (e)
Can the third party compel the second party to sue? Can the second sell a release to
the first party? These questions can be raised on contexts which make a uniform
answer unacceptable. (i) The question arises in the context of the Trustee in
Bankruptcy's liquidating the second party's estate. (See Beswick, supra, note 32 at
101 per Lord Upjohn), who suggests that the Trustee can compromise the
agreement when creditors are pressing and the agreement is onerous on the second
party. Suppose, however, that the second party had performed completely, prior to
the bankruptcy. (ii) The second party needs the money for proposed surgery. (iii) In
cases such as Greenwood in which the second party has bargained for the third
party's immunity, can he, regardless of the circumstances, sell that immunity back
to the first party?
The basic question is why the third party should have enforceable rights or, to
state the matter differently, what is the source of the rights. Conclusional
pigeonholing into trust, agency etc., does not answer these questions. So long as
the law resolves controversies in this way, there is no reason to reject Lord
Denning's ploy, that the third party has enforceable rights because he has a
property right in the contract. It is no less conclusionary and perhaps more
manageable. Beswick v. Beswick, supra, note 32 rejected this argument, which
Lord Denning had based on interpreting "property" in s. 56 of The Law of
Property Act, 1925 (15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20). The House of Lords held that
"property" meant only real property. This result however was not forced. Courts
have taken greater liberties with a statute. Also the word "property" is by itself
neutral. It is now trite learning that property and right are tautological, and the
circle is broken by the court's willingness to give a remedy. It is also trite learning
that the definition of property reflects the times and that we presently are in a period
in which rights are rapidly expanding. See, International News Service v. The
Associated Press (1918), 248 U.S. 214; Reich, The New Property (1963-4), 73
Yale L.J. 733.
Perhaps Lord Denning was too cautious in presenting the property argument
through s.56. The House of Lords was able to interpret the argument out of
existence. If the argument had been brought as a matter of common law, it could
not have been deflected so readily or without a fundamental inquiry.
67. Jackson v. Horizon Holidays Ltd., supra, note 39; Gore v. Van der Lann
(Liverpool Corporation intervening), supra, note 32.
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The Court also could have classified Greenwood as a
master-servant or insurance case, and in relieving the employees of
liability, used Greenwood as an opportunity to reject Lister v.
Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co. Ltd.
In Lister, a truck driver made his employer vicariously liable by
negligently, and in the course of his employment, backing a truck
over a workmate. The employer, a corporation, had obtained motor
vehicle liability insurance covering this specific risk, but insured
only its own liability. The House of Lords established (a) that the
corporate employer had an indemnity action against the employee,
(b) that its insurance carrier could subrogate itself to the employer's
action and (c) that the employer had no obligation to indemnify the
employees.
Just as the idea of vicarious immunity is latent and unexpressed in
all the attempts to protect the employees, so is the feeling that
Greenwood raises the issues in Lister. Greenwood is analogous
because it involves an employer, who ordinarily would be
vicariously liable but is not subject to financial loss (he even may be
an insured under the policy), and an insurance company and a
landlord who have "assumed the risk" and are trying to recoup
losses from an employee. In both cases, the risk came to fruition
through the employee's act.
The decision in Lister has provoked intense and unanimous
criticism. 68 The employee's arguments are compelling and the
rationalizations are not only plausible but statistically probable. The
passage of time has only made the arguments better. Lister cannot
be followed without reflection even in Britain. The facts suggest
collusion making the result not unwelcome. The injured workmate
was the driver's father and he was held to be one-third responsible
for his own injuries. Feelings about what is right and wrong in
labour and insurance matters have changed dramatically in the 25
years since this case was decided. Insofar as Lister depends on the
absence of an implied term in the contract of employment negating
the employee's common law obligation to indemnify the master,
69
68. E.g., Glanville Williams, Vicarious Liability and the Master's Indemnity
(1957), 20 M.L.R. 220 at 437.
69. The court, on these facts, refused to imply as a term of the employment
contract that the employee would receive the benefit of the employer's insurance:
that "the convenant would run" to the employee in the words of T. Eaton v. Smith.
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the case may have limited generality. 70 In any event, Lister is law
only in theory in Britain. It stands because insurers have a
gentleman's agreement not to assert their legal rights. 71
Lister was not cited to the Nova Scotia courts, but they sensed the
Lister issues and rejected liability. The Supreme Court, also without
being referred to Lister, inadvertently seems to accept Lister by
imposing liability. 72 Canadian insurance and labour law were not
crying out forLister.
Conclusion
Karl Llewellyn wrote in an enthusiastic and romantic moment:
I doubt if the matter has ever been better put than by that amazing
legal historian and commercial lawyer, Levin Goldschmidt:
"Every fact-pattern of common life, so far as the legal order can
take it in, carries within itself its appropriate, natural rules, its
right law. This is a natural law which is real, not imaginary; it is
not a creature of mere reason, but rests on the solid foundation of
what reason can recognize in the nature of man and the life
conditions of the time and place; it is thus not eternal nor
changeless nor everywhere the same, but is indwelling in the very
70. Harvey v. R. G. O'Dell Ltd., [1958] 1 All E.R. 657 (Q.B.). The employee
caused injury while driving in the course and scope of employment. He did not
have to indemnify because he was hired as a storekeeper, not a driver.
71. Morris v. Ford Motor Co. Ltd., supra, note 21 But cf., Janata Bank v. Ahmed
(1982), 132 New L.J. 46 (E.C.A.). The bank's employee negligently made bad
loans and was obliged to indemnify the employer. The facts make one suspect
fraud, in which case it cannot be doubted that the employer should have indemnity.
However, fraud is virtually impossible to prove when an employee is required to
exercise judgment and indemnity for negligence may be necessary as a practical
matter.
72. Lister has been followed several times in Canada without any discussion of the
merits of the decision or the obligation to follow the House of Lords, and without
any attempt to distinguish the case. Texada Towing Co. Ltd. v. Minette (1969), 71
W.W.R. 417 (B.C.S.C.); Overmeyer Co. of Canada Ltd. v. Wallace Transfer Ltd.
and Pringle, [1976] 2 W.W.R. 656 (B.C.C.A.), but see per Seaton J.A.
dissenting. Although Lister was followed in McKee v. Dumas (1975), 8 O.R. (2d)
229 (H.C.), the point was relatively minor, perhaps irrelevant as a practical matter,
and recognized as not well developed. Another way of saddling the employee with
liability is through the employer's statutory claim for contribution from the
employee as a joint tortfeasor, Ryan v. Fildes, [1938] 3 All E.R. 517 (K.B.);
Necula v. Ducharme (1963), 38 D.L.R. (2d) 736 (Alta. S.C.). Necula held that the
employer could get statutory contribution and the Lister question therefore need not
be reached. But see, Lister, supra, note 5 at 580, where Viscount Simonds stated
that the statutory claim can be maintained only if a contract claim exists.
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circumstances of life. The highest task of law-giving consists in
uncovering and implementing this immanent law."
73
Llewellyn did not mean in quoting Goldschmidt that perfect
justice could be achieved, if one thought long enough about the
problem and understood it well enough. His thesis was that
universal rules are frail and ephemeral guides to the resolution of
controversies. Cases should be seen as "transaction-types" which
are governed by their own equities and these equities change with
"life conditions".
But both formalism and this relational pragmatism are part of the
common law tradition and at times formalism has predominated. At
times, contract law has forgotten that its rules originated as ad hoc
means of answering the fundamental question: why should someone
be held to his promise? Thus the passenger in Alder v. Dickson was
bound to the ship owner by a shockingly harsh, unknown and
unnegotiable term, while the consignee of the goods in Midland
Silicones could ignore a term which was fair, negotiated, and relied
upon. Subsuming Greenwood into the third party beneficiary rule
confuses means with ends on a grand scale; Greenwood is anything
but a contract case. Classifying it as such forecloses whole fields of
inquiry. Applying a purportedly universal doctrine prevents an
inquiry into the fact pattern's inherent values before it can begin.
Such an inquiry might lead to the articulation of a third party
beneficiary rule which more closely reflects values and defines the
range of facts to which it is relevant.
One must hesitate in criticizing Greenwood as an example of
Llewellyn's aphorism, indirect means are unreliable means .7 4 The
strength of the common law comes from a purposive application of
these misstated and inadequate rules, including the third party
beneficiary rule. But an examination of the judgment and the record
in Greenwood does not show that the Court directly or indirectly
advanced the law or any of its purposes other than by giving cause
for an outcry which may move the legislature to intervene and
reverse the decision. Perhaps this was the Court's intent. There are
institutional restraints even on the court of last resort for Canada in
73. K. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Decising Appeals, (1960) at 122,
quoting from Goldschmidt, Preface to Kritik des Entwurfs eines Handelsgesetz-
buchs, Krit. Zeitschrf.d. ges. Rechtswissenschaft, Vol. 4, No. 4.
74. Karl Llewellyn's companion aphorism is "Techniques without ideals may be a
menace, but ideals without techniques are a mess".
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making law; like the British courts, the Court can make law
passively. But Greenwood issues arise in relationships which
traditionally have been managed primarily by the judicial, not the
legislative branch. If the legislature intervenes - and there is much
competition for its attention in these difficult times - it will
probably speak only to the very facts of the case and amend the fire
provisions of the Insurance Act 75 or the like. Over-particularization
is as debilitating to the law as over-generalization. Greenwood is to
be regretted as an opportunity missed as much as for what it actually
held.
75. See e.g. The Insurance Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 148, s.90(1), which identifies a
person who drives an auto with the consent of the owner of the auto to the owner.
